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HOME TEAM ADVANTAGE?: THE TAKING OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR SPORTS STADIUMS
Erin A. Stanton*
I. INTRODUCTION
It was 1957, and Brooklyn Dodgers fans were in mourning.
Their championship team was suddenly being taken from them, as
owner Walter O’Malley decided to move the team to Los Angeles
after losing his fight with New York City to get a new ballpark.  Al-
though the Dodgers were being taken from Brooklyn, something
even more vital was being taken from the residents of the Los An-
geles neighborhood Chavez Ravine: their homes.
Eminent domain has long been exploited as a means of taking
private property for sports arenas, but it is only now emerging as a
public issue.  Private enterprises that own sports teams are looking
for prime real estate in order to relocate and build larger, more
sophisticated stadiums.  This real estate is centrally located in
populated cities and conveniently accessible by public transporta-
tion.  It is occupied by millions of people who reside in houses and
apartments or own and operate stores, restaurants, and other busi-
nesses—people who are part of a community and have no inten-
tion of moving.  Yet, when private corporations persuade local
governments to exercise their powers of eminent domain, unsus-
pecting residents are forcibly bought out of their property to make
way for retractable-rooftop stadiums with luxury box seats and
large parking lots.
Such were Walter O’Malley’s intentions in 1955, when he be-
gan to complain that the Brooklyn Dodgers had “outgrown” Ebbets
Field.1  He sold the stadium because “[h]e wanted a new, larger,
round, domed ballpark which he thought would be fine at Atlantic
and Flatbush [A]venues.”2  Brooklyn Borough President John
Cashmore approved a plan to build a new ballpark, but the Parks
Commissioner Robert Moses did not.  Moses chastised O’Malley
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for even considering using public money and the city’s powers of
eminent domain to build a sports stadium.3  Today, new developers
and politicians have replaced the Moseses and O’Malleys of the
1950s.  Once again in Brooklyn, New York on the corner of Atlan-
tic and Flatbush Avenues, private developers wish to use the state’s
eminent domain powers to condemn the land so they can build a
new arena—this time for the New Jersey Nets basketball team.4
This misuse of eminent domain is not unique to New York.  In
Arlington, Texas, the city created a separate corporation, the Ar-
lington Sports Facilities Development Authority, Inc. and endowed
it with the power of eminent domain.5  The Authority used this
power to seize thirteen acres of private property for the Rangers’
new ballpark.6  In New Jersey, plans to relocate the Devils hockey
team are seen as part of the revitalization of downtown Newark.7
The projected area for this new arena consists of existing offices
that had relocated downtown in an attempt to revive the area.8
The Boston Red Sox have asked the city to use its eminent domain
power to acquire fourteen acres of land for a proposed new sta-
dium, which would be adjacent to the team’s current location at
Fenway Park.9
Section II of this Article describes the development of eminent
domain and its role in urban renewal.  It discusses the taking of
private property for private sports enterprises under the guise of
“redevelopment” in the public interest.  Section III examines the
evolving interpretation of “public use” and explores the latitude of
municipal power in its authority to take private land through con-
demnation to build new sports stadiums.  Section IV argues that
history and case studies show that sports stadiums are not a public
benefit and that private land should not be taken for their con-
struction.  Section V suggests proposals to protect the public from
private takings, including a strict interpretation of “public pur-
pose.”  This Section also discusses recent cases defining “public
purpose” and the future application of eminent domain.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See ARLINGTON SPORTS FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, INC., THE BALLPARK
IN ARLINGTON, http://www.ci.arlington.tx.us/finance/pdf/sports/finplan1.pdf.
6 Robert Bryce, Stealing Home, TEX. OBSERVER, May 9, 1997, at 6.
7 See Joan Gralla, Newark, N.J. Says Wins Devils Hockey Team, REUTERS, Feb. 10, 2004.
8 Id.
9 Meg Vaillancourt, Springfield Ballpark Ruling Could Affect Fenway Proposal: Critics
Welcome Judge’s Decision Against City’s Land-Takings, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2000, at
C20.
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II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND ITS ROLE IN URBAN RENEWAL
The Constitution of the United States provides that a person
shall not be deprived of private property unless that property is
being taken for a public use and the property owner is provided
with just compensation.10  Historically, the theories of John Locke,
which inspired the governmental structure of the United States,
included a strong conviction that government is formed to protect
the property of individuals, not to take their property away.11  The
public use exception in the Fifth Amendment was intended to en-
sure that if one person’s private land was taken, it would be for the
benefit of the public.  The authority given to the government to
take someone’s private property has developed into the doctrine of
eminent domain.
Eminent domain is defined as “[t]he inherent power of a gov-
ernmental entity to take privately owned property, [especially]
land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensa-
tion for the taking.”12  Although the Fifth Amendment cannot re-
strict the powers of the states with regard to eminent domain, it is
obligatory on states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
prohibits the states from depriving any person of his property with-
out due process of law.13
Each state has similar legislation governing the power of emi-
nent domain.  For example, New York’s constitution declares that
local governments “shall have power to take by eminent domain
private property within their boundaries for public use . . . but no
more than is sufficient to provide for appropriate disposition or
use of land . . . for such public use . . . .”14  It also enables the
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). See also William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 595 (1972).  Stoebuck notes that allowing the
use of eminent domain to transfer private property to other private parties “would
violate the most fundamental Lockeian principle that governments were instituted to
protect every man’s property against his neighbor’s depredations.” Id.
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (8th ed. 2005).
13 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).  “The Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits the government from taking private property for public use without just
compensation.” Id. (citation omitted).  “The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do
not prohibit the taking of property without just compensation.  Therefore, there is no
constitutional injury until the plaintiff has availed himself of the state’s procedures for
obtaining compensation for the injury, and been denied compensation.”  San Remo
Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted).
14 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1, subsec. (e).
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legislature to authorize and regulate the power of eminent
domain.15
Similarly, California empowers its legislature with eminent do-
main decision-making.16  Although its constitution states that the
power of eminent domain can be exercised to acquire property for
public use only, “public use” is not specifically defined.17  Texas
allows local governments to decide what can be taken via eminent
domain.18  However, before the authority acquires the private
property, it must adopt a resolution “describing the real property
and declaring the acquisition of the property necessary for the pur-
poses of the authority.”19
All states are congruous with the federal Constitution in that
the taking by eminent domain must be for a public purpose, and
that the property owner must be compensated for the fair market
value of the property.20  However, states are not consistent in their
definition of what constitutes public purpose, causing an inconsis-
tent application of eminent domain throughout the country.
A. The History of Public-Private Takings
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the author-
ity of sovereigns to take private property for public use is well-
founded at common law and is also constitutionally guaranteed.21
Although eminent domain may seem to require an unfair sacrifice
by property owners, if used appropriately, “it was and is a necessary
compromise in the tension between the rights of private citizens
and the interests of the public.”22
In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of an urban renewal plan that took property from private
owners in a “blighted” area and resold it to developers who would
promote a safe environment and desirable economic develop-
15 Id.
16 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“The Legislature may provide for possession by the
condemnor following commencement of eminent domain proceedings . . . .”).
17 Id.
18 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 392.061(a) (Vernon 1999).
19 Id. “An authority may acquire an interest in real property, including a fee simple
interest, by the exercise of the power of eminent domain after it adopts a resolution
describing the real property and declaring the acquisition of the property necessary
for the purposes of the authority under this chapter.” Id.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1876) (“The right of eminent do-
main was one of those means well known when the Constitution was adopted, and
employed to take lands for public uses.”).
22 Bill Sizemore, Eminent Domain, A Court Repents, Aug. 12, 2004, http://www.new-
swithviews.com/Bill/sizemore24.htm.
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ment.23  Congress enacted the District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Act of 1945 to combat the decaying housing conditions in
Washington, D.C. through redevelopment of blighted areas.24
This Act allowed for the acquisition of private property that would
immediately be transferred to private entities pursuant to a land-
use plan for development of business, housing, and similar uses.25
The Supreme Court upheld the taking of a department store as a
valid public use because “Congress and its authorized agencies
have made determinations that [took] into account a wide variety
of values.”26 Berman permitted the government to take private land
from one and give it to another by utilizing its eminent domain
power in order to redevelop “blighted” areas.27  Furthermore, the
Supreme Court established in Berman that deference is given to leg-
islative intent when considering what constitutes a public use
under the Fifth Amendment.28
In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court decided the landmark
case Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.29  That case per-
mitted the city of Detroit to condemn nearly 500 acres of private
land under eminent domain and sell it to General Motors.30  Ap-
proximately 1400 homes and over 100 businesses were forced to
relocate so General Motors could build a new auto plant with the
condition that it would alleviate unemployment and revitalize “the
economic base of the community.”31  Historically, this decision
broadened the interpretation of “public purpose” to include a
“public-private” taking.32  A “public-private” taking occurs when the
government takes private property for a public purpose through its
eminent domain power, but conveys the property to a private en-
tity.33  For over two decades, Poletown set precedent until County of
Wayne v. Hathcock,34 in which the Michigan Supreme Court over-
23 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954).
24 Id. at 28.
25 Id. at 29.
26 Id. at 33.
27 Id. at 35.
28 Id. at 33.
29 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
30 Id. at 460.
31 Id. at 459.
32 See William Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain:
A Constitutional Liberty Under Attack, 4 PACE L. REV. 231, 257 (1984) (arguing that
Poletown sets a “dangerous precedent”).
33 Jeffrey W. Scott, Public Use and Private Profit: When Should Heightened Scrutiny Be
Applied to “Public-Private” Takings?, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
466, 466 (2003).
34 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
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turned Poletown.  The court ruled that personal property rights are
fundamental rights protected under the state constitution, and the
Poletown decision was a “radical departure” from those constitution-
ally protected rights.35  But the reversal of Poletown may have come
too late, as the court’s ruling in that case paved the way for the
historically liberal interpretation of public purpose.36
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court further expanded the
public use interpretation in 1984.  In Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, the Hawaii legislature had ascertained that seventy-two pri-
vate individuals owned approximately half of the state’s land.37
This prompted the legislature to conclude that the real estate mar-
ket was skewed and that a public purpose existed for the legislature
to act.38  To solve these problems, the legislature created a mecha-
nism to condemn and transfer ownership of the landowners’ land
to current tenants.39  The Supreme Court, in upholding Hawaii’s
public-private transfer scheme, found that such takings were within
the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Public Use Clause.40
The Midkiff decision also reaffirmed the deference given by
the Court to legislative determinations of public use by applying
low-level scrutiny, the rational basis test.41  The Court said, “where
the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compen-
sated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”42  There-
fore, “if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are
substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must
defer to its determination that the taking will serve a public use.”43
The policy behind this deference is that legislatures are better able
than the courts to assess the public purposes advanced by an exer-
cise of eminent domain.
More recently, the Supreme Court affirmed its prior decisions
when it ruled in the controversial eminent domain case involving
the city of New London’s taking of privately owned houses to make
way for an “integrated development plan designed to revitalize its
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); Tolksdorf v. Grif-
fith, 626 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. 2001); City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc.,
552 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1996).
37 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 233-34.
40 Id. at 231-32, 241-42.
41 Id. at 241.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 244.
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ailing economy.”44  The development project would be constructed
on ninety acres in Fort Trumbull, Connecticut, which was inhab-
ited by 115 privately owned properties.45  Its projected use would
comprise of a waterfront conference hotel, restaurants, shopping
venues, several marinas, a U.S. Coast Guard Museum, office and
retail space, and eighty new residences to create an urban commu-
nity.46 Citing Midkiff and Berman in its decision, the Supreme
Court stated that although the city could not take the petitioners’
land simply to confer a private benefit on a particular private party,
the taking was legal because the development plan was not
adopted to “benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.”47
It further noted that it has long rejected “any literal requirement
that condemned property be put into use for the . . . public.”48
Instead, it has “embraced the broader and more natural interpreta-
tion of public use as a ‘public purpose.’”49
This ruling is unsound in two ways.  First, it supports the the-
ory that if the private parties associated with a taking are not abso-
lutely identified (e.g., private parties purchasing the property from
developers once construction is complete), the taking will be legal
because, at the time of the taking, no named private individuals
will benefit.50  Second, as Justice O’Connor stated in her dissent,
the Court abandoned its “long-held, basic limitation on govern-
ment power.  Under the banner of economic development, all pri-
vate property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to
another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded,” which
essentially erases the words “for public use” from the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.51
As the public use benefit is seemingly fading from the applica-
tion of eminent domain, jurisdictions throughout the nation have
applied their own interpretation as to what constitutes a public
purpose.
B. “Blight” Eradication as a Public Purpose
State and local governments, empowered by eminent domain,
have capitalized upon this broadened application of “public use.”
44 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2656.
45 Id. at 2659.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 2662.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 2661-62.
51 Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
100 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:93
Under the guise of “revitalization” or “urban renewal,” officials de-
termine what geographical areas would be best served by condem-
nation and redevelopment.  These targeted areas usually consist of
minority and low-income communities that have little voice in the
decision-making process.
In order to legally condemn property, the local government or
authority must establish that the area is blighted.52  A “blighted
area” is defined as “[a]n unaesthetic and uneconomic section; an
area of such kind that razing all the buildings will serve a public
purpose, even though a few of them may not be substandard or
blighted.”53  Pertaining to real estate, it is an area “marked by ter-
mination of healthy growth and development accompanied by de-
terioration and decline of property values . . . the shame of every
metropolis.”54
It is widely held that urban renewal or redevelopment and the
elimination of blight are public purposes, and that state legisla-
tures may properly grant the right of eminent domain to housing
authorities or local governments to carry out such purposes with-
out constitutional violation.55  The theory is that these slums, or
“blighted” areas, are a “breeding ground for juvenile delinquency,
infant mortality, crime, disease, and waste.”56  Therefore, it is for
the benefit of the public if the government condemns these areas,
takes the property via eminent domain, and then conveys the land
to a private developer to “revitalize” the community.
When confronted with issues of urban development legisla-
tion, courts have consistently deemed an area “blighted” based on
52 See generally Emmington v.  Solano County Redev. Agency, 195 Cal. App. 3d
491(1987) (holding before a project area can properly be selected for redevelop-
ment, it must be blighted); Berman, 348 U.S. at 26 (enforcing the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act, which granted power to acquire real property through eminent
domain for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of blight).
53 BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (3d ed. 1969).
54 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 233 (3d ed. 2002).
55 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 26. See also, Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 104
A.2d 365, 369 (1954) (“[T]he acquisition of property for the purpose of eliminating
substandard, insanitary, deteriorated, slum or blighted conditions . . . [and] the exer-
cise of powers by municipalities acting through agencies known as redevelopment . . .
are public uses and purposes for which public money may be expended and the
power of eminent domain exercised.”); Hunter v. Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth., 78
S.E.2d 893, 896 (Va. 1953) (holding that the clearance and reconstruction of blighted
areas are necessary for the public welfare); Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Greenman, 96
N.W.2d 673, 680 (1959) (“[T]he elimination of a slum district is a direct benefit to all
property owners, even as the establishment of a parkway would be a benefit to them
all.”).
56 Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, What Constitutes “Blighted Area” Within Urban
Renewal and Redevelopment Statutes, 45 A.L.R.3d 1096, 1100 (1972).
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its overall condition and not “the condition of individual parcels
and structures” within the area.57  The Court in Berman allowed the
government to attack the blight problem in an entire neighbor-
hood, “rather than on a structure-by-structure basis.”58  Therefore,
thriving, enterprising businesses and residential communities lo-
cated too close to blighted areas can be condemned if they are
obstacles to redevelopment plans for the area as a whole.
For example, Los Angeles removed a flourishing residential
community in Chavez Ravine under the guise of eminent domain
for a baseball stadium for the Dodgers.59  Chavez Ravine was home
to about 1100 “mainly poor, mainly Mexican American families.”60
Funded by the National Housing Act of 1949, the city cited Chavez
Ravine as a “blighted area” and notified residents that it would
purchase their property and rebuild the area to create more than
10,000 new and improved housing units.61  The letters containing
this eviction notice also promised the homeowners first choice of
the housing to be built.62  The city then began buying the property
and condemning the homes.  It also evicted those residents who
did not want to leave by using its powers of eminent domain.  In
1953, the Housing Authority cancelled the housing project.63  It
became clear that there would be no federal homes in Chavez Ra-
vine and no civic attempt to honor the right of first choice in new
homes that had been promised to its residents.64  That year the
Housing Authority sold 170 acres of Chavez Ravine to Los Ange-
les.65  The city then contracted with Walter O’Malley to transfer the
Brooklyn Dodgers to the West Coast, offering Chavez Ravine for
their future stadium.  Opponents of this deal criticized the city for
the betrayal of its previous commitment to keep Chavez Ravine for
public use.  Councilman Edward Roybal urged, “It is not morally or
legally right for a governmental agency to condemn private land,
take it away from the property owner through [e]minent [d]omain
proceedings, then turn around and give it to a private person or
corporation for private gain.  This I believe is a gross misuse of
57 Id.
58 Berman, 348 U.S. at 34.
59 See Manbeck, supra note 1, at 14.
60 Mike Boehm, Requiem for the Ravine, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at E1.
61 DON NORMARK, CHAVEZ RAVINE, 1949: A LOS ANGELES STORY 17-18 (1999).
62 See id. at 18.
63 Arechiga v. Hous. Auth. of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. Rptr. 338, 340 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
64 Id. at 340-41.
65 NORMARK, supra note 61, at 21.
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[e]minent [d]omain.”66
Chavez Ravine represented a struggle between residents of a
neighborhood community, who were fighting to keep their homes,
and city officials, who—by labeling the Chavez homes “blighted”—
could use the power of eminent domain for the purpose of rede-
velopment.  This is a perpetual struggle to which residents and
businesses in susceptible communities are subject.  As most courts
have left the interpretation of “public use” to state and local legisla-
tors, condemnation of private property in anticipation of new sta-
dium construction has become a recognized power of city officials.
The “blight” theory has been further established throughout
the country in situations where officials have located real property
ideal for a future stadium and then used their power of eminent
domain to evict current inhabitants.  For example in 1998, the city
of Cincinnati entered into an agreement with a private developer
to redevelop its riverfront area, which would include the construc-
tion of Paul Brown Stadium—the new football stadium for the Ben-
gals.  The agreement specified that this redevelopment would
“eliminate blight and transform the riverfront into a nucleus of ec-
onomic development . . . .”67  Pursuant to Ohio’s Revised Code,
which declared that the board “may acquire, construct, improve,
maintain . . . or otherwise contract for the acquisition or use of
sports facilities,”68 the County Board acquired the riverfront prop-
erty, using eminent domain to remove existing businesses, and
commenced construction.
Riverfront business owners whose property was taken from
them argued unsuccessfully that their land was not blighted.69
They also argued that the county could not use eminent domain
powers to take the land, because a football stadium is not consid-
ered a public use.70  The judge disagreed, stating that there are
intangible benefits to the taxpayers flowing from the presence of a
National Football League franchise in the county.71
Property owners do not have much influence in determining
what is considered blighted.  More states need to enact legislation
to define blight so that a bright-line test can be applied to poten-
tially condemned areas.  As it currently stands, in most states the
66 Chavez Ravine Historical Timeline (on file with New York City Law Review).
67 State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Krings, 758 N.E.2d 1135, 1136 (Ohio 2001).
68 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §307.023 (West 2005).
69 Steve Goldsmith, Eminent Domain Ruling by Ohio Judge Clears Bond Sale for Cincin-
nati Stadium, BOND BUYER, Dec. 26, 1997, at 29.
70 See id.
71 See id.
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public does not know how to defend against the accusation that a
neighborhood is blighted and in need of “redevelopment” because
there is no concrete definition of blight in the legislation.  Due to
the ineffectiveness of the blight argument, residents must argue
the same issue that the Cincinnati business owners argued: A sta-
dium is not a public use.
III. “PUBLIC USE” DEFINED AND EXPANDED IN THE
STADIUM CONTEXT
“Public use” is defined as “[t]he public’s beneficial right to use
property or facilities subject to condemnation.”72  There are two
basic views of public use: the broad, “advantage-to-the-public” view,
and the narrow, “use-by-the-public” view.73  Courts have virtually
abandoned the narrow use-by-the-public application because it re-
quires that the public directly benefit from the proposed condem-
nation.74  Instead, courts have applied the broad definition such
that if a taking could promote the general welfare of the public, it
satisfies the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, re-
gardless of what private enterprises benefit.75  Moreover, if the
identities of the private recipients are not immediately identifiable
at the time of taking, the taking is not considered to be benefiting
private parties at all.76
Because legislation does not define “public use,” the lack of
constraint, combined with broad case interpretation, has en-
couraged city and state officials to err on the side of private devel-
opers.  The local rules of eminent domain facilitate this process in
that they incorporate “sports facilities” into their definition of what
is considered a public use.77  Eminent domain is no longer a con-
72 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1288 (8th ed. 2005).
73 See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L.
REV. 203, 205-06 (1978) (discussing the basic meaning of the two public use
perspectives).
74 Id. at 205 (suggesting that the broad advantage-to-the-public view is favored by
today’s courts interpreting “public use”).
75 See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); Tolksdorf v.
Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. 2001); City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets,
Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1996).
76 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661-62 n.6 (“It is, of course, difficult to accuse the govern-
ment of having taken A’s property to benefit the private interests of B when the iden-
tity of B was unknown.”).
77 See e.g., TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 325.036 (a) (Vernon 1999) (a sports facil-
ity district may acquire by condemnation any land “necessary to construct or improve
a sports facility”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 25351 (West 2003) (defining “public building”
to include a “stadium, coliseum, sports arena, or sports pavilion or other building for
holding sports events”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-650 (West 2003) (“[T]he devel-
104 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:93
cise doctrine, but rather a broad guideline giving power to state
and local governments to dictate where it will be used and how it
will benefit the public.  More frustrating is that state legislatures
empower local governments, authorities, and even corporations
with this authority.78
In New York, the state may delegate the right of eminent do-
main to a corporation provided the property is to be taken for a
public use.79  Since the interpretation of public use is broad, and
its application varies in each jurisdiction, the state is giving private
corporations control over its residents’ constitutionally protected
rights.  The lack of a concise definition of public use threatens se-
curity in homes and businesses because it empowers private corpo-
rations to use the government’s takings power to benefit from
private property.  This is what fuels developers to set their sights on
prime real estate in hopes of using eminent domain to remove the
established businesses and residences to make way for a more lu-
crative development.80  Such unconscionable abuse of government
power has become commonplace across America.81
A. The Los Angeles Dodgers: Stadiums Are a “Public Use”
Consider the city officials of Los Angeles in the 1950s.  In or-
der to acquire the Brooklyn Dodgers, the city executed a contract
with the Brooklyn National League Baseball Club.  It promised to
convey to the ball club approximately 185 acres of land it owned in
Chavez Ravine. In addition, Los Angeles would use its “best efforts”
to acquire additional land totaling about 300 acres.82  The Califor-
nia Supreme Court described “best efforts” by stating that the city
opment and operation of the stadium facility, convention center, related parking fa-
cilities and other related public improvements and state participation in and
assistance to such associated private development are significant governmental uses
and functions for which the exercise of state power may be exercised and are public
purposes . . .  and in the public interest and for the public benefit . . . .”).
78 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1, subsec. (e) (“Local governments shall have power to
take by eminent domain private property within their boundaries for public use
. . . .”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“The Legislature may provide for possession by the
condemnor following commencement of eminent domain proceedings . . . .”); TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 392.061 (a) (Vernon 1999).
79 In re Northville Dock Pipe Line Corp. v. Fanning, 21 N.E.2d 220, 221 (N.Y.
1968) (“It is well established . . . that a corporation . . . must be acting for a ‘public
use’ when it seeks to exercise its condemnation powers.”).
80 Dana Hedgpeth, Supreme Court Case Could Affect Baseball Stadium, WASH. POST,
Feb. 23, 2005, at E1.
81 Id.
82 City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 333 P.2d 745, 749 (Cal.
1959).
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could spend up to $2,000,000 to place the property in a proper
condition to convey to the ball club.  Los Angeles would retain title
to 40 of the 300 acres for twenty years “to assure performance by
the ball club of its obligations to provide and maintain certain rec-
reational facilities during that period, after which title is to be con-
veyed to the club.”83
In applying the doctrine of eminent domain, the court deter-
mined that the city had a proper public purpose.  It viewed the
contract as a whole, stating that “the fact that some of the provi-
sions may be of benefit only to the baseball club is immaterial, pro-
vided the city receives benefits which serve legitimate public
purposes.”84  The court further elaborated that the “transfer of
Wrigley Field from the ball club to the city,” as well as the construc-
tion and maintenance of the recreational facilities were “obviously
for public purposes.”85
As for the additional acreage the city would acquire, the court
held that this land would be part of the consideration of the con-
tract that enabled the city to enter into an advantageous bargain
for a legitimate public purpose.86  The city’s acquisition of land for
the purpose of immediately selling it to a private corporation did
not have an effect on the court’s ruling, which cited the city char-
ter that stated that the city was authorized to buy “anything useful
or convenient” in connection with the exercise of its powers.87
This holding gave city officials bargaining power in their ef-
forts to attract sports clubs.  Under the pretext of public benefit,
local governments in California could condemn and acquire land
through eminent domain and then use it as a bargaining tool to
contract with sports franchises.  A few years later, the City of
Anaheim expanded this interpretation.
B. Anaheim Angels: “Public Use” Includes Stadium Parking Lots
In City of Anaheim v. Michel, the city had already built and de-
veloped Anaheim Stadium next to the defendants’ property, but it
also wanted to condemn the defendants’ land for parking and ac-
cessibility to the stadium.  The lower court had concluded that
Anaheim lacked the power to exercise eminent domain for sports
83 Id. at 749.
84 Id. at 751.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 752.
87 Id.
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arena parking.88
However, the Court of Appeals, citing the California Code of
Civil Procedure,89 held that the city’s use of the stadium and sur-
rounding parking area constituted a public use.  It stated that while
the statute conferring the power of eminent domain should be
strictly construed, its construction should not frustrate legislative
intent.90  This further broadened the power of eminent domain to
condemn private property for parking and ingress and egress asso-
ciated with a multi-purpose stadium, subject only to proof by the
government authority that the land is being acquired for a public
use.91
The expansive interpretation of public use to include stadiums
and their parking facilities has enabled states to anticipate econom-
ically viable and accessible locations for potential sports stadiums.
Working in conjunction with private businesses and developers, lo-
cal officials compete for and acquire national sports teams by offer-
ing new and sophisticated stadiums situated in profitable locations.
Although sports stadiums might benefit the public by providing en-
tertainment to the people and perhaps boosting the local econ-
omy,92 the real benefit goes to the private corporations that profit
from constructing, developing, and selling the land that was basi-
cally handed over to them.
C. The Texas Rangers: “Public Use” Allows Private Gain
In what is considered the “first time in Texas history that the
power of eminent domain has been used to assist a private organi-
zation like a baseball team,”93 the Texas Rangers received legisla-
tive approval for the creation of the Arlington Sports Facilities
Development Authority, Inc. (ASFDA), a quasi-governmental entity
endowed with the power of eminent domain.94  Through the
88 City of Anaheim v. Michel, 66 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
89 Id. Section 1238.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provided that the
right of eminent domain may extend to property used for “[o]ff-street motor vehicle
parking places, including property necessary or convenient for ingress thereto or
egress therefrom.” Id.  This section was repealed in 1975 as unnecessary because nu-
merous other statutes were deemed to authorize city acquisition of private property
for parking facilities. Id.
90 Id. at 546.
91 Id.
92 Errol A. Cockfield, Jr., Jets Stadium Report: City Fumbled Numbers, NEWSDAY, July 2,
2004, at A5 (stating that the proposed new Jets stadium would create 3586 jobs, attract
20 non-sports events each year, and reap $28,400,000 in new city tax revenue).
93 Bryce, Stealing Home, supra note 6, at 8.
94 See generally ARLINGTON SPORTS FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, INC., supra
note 5.
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ASFDA, the Rangers were able to seize thirteen acres of private
property to build their new ballpark.95
Although the Rangers and city officials argued that condemna-
tion did not exceed governmental power,96 several lawsuits have
sprung from this action.97  The Mathes family owned three parcels
of land, consisting of nearly thirteen acres, located near the sta-
dium site.  Using its eminent domain powers, ASFDA seized the
land and offered below-market value for all three tracts.98  In May
of 1996, a county court found ASFDA’s offer too low and awarded
the Mathes family the difference.99  This ruling has since been ap-
pealed by ASFDA, which thought it excessive.
However, what is truly excessive is that the Rangers ball club, a
private corporation, receives all the revenue generated by the
Mathes’ land and other land acquired by eminent domain.  Pres-
ently, the Texas Rangers have development rights over the entire
270-acre complex, which includes an amphitheater, office build-
ings, shops, and restaurants.100  Arlington Mayor Richard Greene
believed there was a public benefit to be derived from building the
ballpark.  He stated, “This project is for the direct benefit of the
Rangers and the community.  There’s a mutual benefit in this pro-
ject, and it’s well accepted and well established in law that this pro-
ject was eligible for that public purpose.”101
Another recipient of the “direct benefit” of the ballpark was
then-Governor George W. Bush, who had a personal ownership in-
terest in the team.  It has been speculated that Bush and other
Rangers managers conspired to use the government’s power of em-
inent domain to further their own private interests.102  A Texas
newspaper wrote, “whether the public interest issue is taxes, size of
government, property rights or public subsidies of private sports
ventures, Bush’s personal ownership interest in the Texas Rangers
baseball team has been wildly at odds with his publicly declared
95 Bryce, Stealing Home, supra note 6, at 8.
96 Id. at 10.
97 See City of Arlington v. Golddust Twins Realty Corp., 41 F.3d 960, 962 (5th Cir.
1994) (finding that “Arlington exercised its eminent domain power for a valid public
purpose,” although Arlington planned to transfer the property to the Rangers for a
future private office complex); see also G.P. Show Productions Inc. v. Arlington Sports
Facilities Dev. Auth. Inc., 873 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that a prop-
erty owner, including a “lessee for years,” is entitled to both a condemnation award
and moving expenses).
98 Bryce, Stealing Home, supra note 6, at 8.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 10.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 6.
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positions on those issues.”103  After convincing Arlington officials
to acquire the land via eminent domain, passing a sales tax in-
crease to pay for 70% of the new stadium, and allowing the Rang-
ers to buy the stadium for one-third of its actual construction
cost,104 it seems that “Bush and his partners hit what can only be
described as a towering home run” when they sold the Texas Rang-
ers for $250,000,000.105  For his $605,000 investment, Bush re-
ceived between $10,000,000 and $14,000,000.106
IV. WHY SPORTS STADIUMS ARE NOT A PUBLIC BENEFIT
A. The Beneficiaries of New Stadiums
The tendency of sports teams to relocate has increased be-
cause of advances in stadium technologies.107  The standard, multi-
purpose stadium of the 1960s and 1970s has morphed into a
sophisticated, single-sport arena with “luxury suites, club boxes,
elaborate concessions, catering, signage, advertising, theme activi-
ties, and even bars, restaurants, and apartments with a view of the
field.”108  With this variety of moneymakers, a new stadium can gen-
erate up to $30,000,000 in extra revenues a year for the team it
houses.109
City leaders have become very aggressive in the competition to
acquire a professional sports team.  Not only will a professional
team put their city “on the map,” but it will also bring in more
revenue opportunities. Usually, city officials do not give residents
an opportunity to participate in, or object to their plans, insisting
instead that a new sports arena will improve the local economy.110
They argue that the building of a new stadium will create construc-
tion and stadium jobs, attract tourists and new industry to boost the
local economy, and the overall increase in local income will have a
“multiplier effect,” which will cause still “more new spending and
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Robert Bryce, Governor Deadbeat, AUSTIN CHRON., Jan. 16, 1998, http://www.aus-
tinchronicle.com/issues/vol17/issue19/pols.bush.html.
106 Id.
107 Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: Are New Stadiums Worth




110 See Neil deMause, The Jets’ End Run: Will Bloomberg and Pataki Spend Billions With-
out Legislative Approval?, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 16, 2004, http://www.villagevoice.com/
news/0446,demause,58454,5.html.
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job creation.”111  These are the same officials who attend games
sitting next to wealthy developers and team owners in the “spar-
kling new luxury boxes,” while the average fan faces steeply in-
creased ticket prices.112
B. Studies Show: New Stadiums Have No Public Benefit
In reality, a new sports facility has an extremely small effect on
the overall economic activity and employment.  A study by the
Brookings Institution found that “[n]o recent facility appears to
have earned anything approaching a reasonable return on invest-
ment . . . .  Regardless of whether the unit of analysis is a local
neighborhood, a city, or an entire metropolitan area, the eco-
nomic benefits of sports facilities are de minimus.”113  Construction
jobs are temporary, and new stadium jobs pay minimum wage.114
Such “benefits” are both provisional and minimal.
These expensive new stadiums are often funded by taxes that
disregard residents’ economic status.115  In city after city, funds des-
perately needed by schools or that would otherwise be used to im-
prove the local infrastructure and enhance job opportunities are
unreasonably allocated to pay the construction costs of these stadi-
ums.116  While attendance may increase when a new stadium is
built, football and baseball both share ticket revenues with other
cities, leaving the local community little to gain.117  Additionally,
the bulk of the sports revenue “goes to a relatively few players,
managers, coaches, and executives who earn extremely high sala-
ries”118 and usually do not live where the team plays, so their in-
come is not spent locally.119
C. Resident Opposition
Some taxpayers are objecting to their money and their land
111 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 107, at 36.
112 JOANNA CAGAN & NEIL DEMAUSE, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE GREAT STADIUM
SWINDLE TURNS PUBLIC MONEY INTO PRIVATE PROFIT, at viii-ix (1998).
113 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 107, at 36.
114 Robert A. Baade, Stadiums, Professional Sports, and Economic Development: Assessing
the Reality, HEARTLAND POLICY STUDY, NO. 62, Apr. 4, 1994, at 20, available at http://
heartland.org/pdf/19765a.pdf.  “The types of jobs induced by stadium activity are
typically low-wage and seasonal: ticket takers, ushers, vendors, restaurant and bar
workers, guards, parking lot attendants, and so on.” Id.
115 CAGAN & DEMAUSE, supra note 112, at 150.
116 Id.
117 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 107, at 36.
118 Id. at 37.
119 Id. at 36.
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benefiting private corporations and team owners.  After watching
their half-cent sales tax increase pay for the acquisition of private
land, as well as the construction costs of building a new stadium for
the Bengals, Ohio residents were angry that the football team con-
tinued to lose after they moved into the new stadium for the 2000
season.  In 2001, the Cincinnati Enquirer won the right to provide
the public with access to all documents regarding the contract for
development of the stadium; the stadium was a public benefit,
therefore the public had a right to access its records.120  This was a
setback to private developers because they now had to make all
relevant documents pertaining to “cost overruns,” communications
between parties, and other reports available to the public.121  Addi-
tionally, a federal court recently ruled that a taxpayer could pursue
a lawsuit alleging the NFL has illegally used its clout to extort new
stadiums from cities.122  U.S. District Judge S. Arthur Spiegel
opined that the NFL was “able to coerce the construction of a new
stadium and negotiate unjustifiably favorable lease terms solely be-
cause of the monopoly that they enjoy over professional foot-
ball.”123  These rulings have provided Ohio residents the right to
retrieve the stadiums’ construction and financial records and use
this information in their future suit against the NFL.
Other residents inhabiting areas of potential stadium develop-
ment are also voicing opposition.  Indeed, this is becoming a na-
tional issue, as an overwhelming amount of sports teams are
seeking to relocate to larger, more sophisticated stadiums.  In New
York, both Brooklyn and the Upper West Side of Manhattan are
being considered for the future stadiums of the New Jersey Nets
and the New York Jets, respectively.  Although residents of both
communities are actively voicing their opposition, at the time this
article was written, only the plans for the Jets stadium on the Upper
West Side have been thwarted.124
In October of 2004, the Pratt Institute Center for Community
and Environmental Development conducted a survey of Prospect
Heights residents for their reaction to the potential development
of a 19,000-seat arena and basketball sports complex in their vicin-
120 Cincinnati Enquirer, 758 N.E.2d at 1141.
121 Id.
122 See Kevin Osborne, Bengals Case Prompts Lawsuit, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 30, 2004,
at 6A.
123 Id.
124 NY Jets Football Team Gives Up W. Side Stadium Site, REUTERS, Aug. 31, 2005, http:/
/www.redorbit.com/news/sports/226565/ny_jets_football_team_gives_up_w_side_
stadium_site/index.html.
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ity.125  Prospect Heights is a Brooklyn neighborhood that cherishes
its sense of community, security, and social and economic diver-
sity.126  The survey concluded that although the residents would
like to see development in their community, such development
should create affordable housing, good jobs, and most importantly,
improve public education, ease traffic and parking congestion, and
enhance neighborhood safety.127  The majority of the respondents
were very concerned about being displaced through the use of emi-
nent domain, which had been suggested by the developer and pro-
ject advocates.128
Unsurprisingly, education, affordable housing, permanent
employment, and security from crime were priorities for the re-
spondents, which, coincidentally, would benefit the public as a
whole.129  However, the Prospect Heights study showed that the sta-
dium complex would negatively impact Prospect Heights; it would
not incorporate the interests of the residents and businesses in the
community.  Instead, it would only further the interests of the pri-
vate developers at the community’s expense.
Similarly in Minneapolis, Minnesota, officials tried to gain sup-
port for new stadiums for the Twins and the Vikings by advocating
a better “quality of life.”  They posited that new stadiums would
give “causes to root for” and “provide the elderly . . . with some-
thing to brighten their lives.”130  These meager arguments
prompted residents to state that there were other ways to benefit
the public, with one witness—an economist—testifying before the
Tax Committee that investing in early childhood education would
be more beneficial.131  Throughout the country, as residents be-
come more aware that they might be at risk of eminent domain
125 Prospect Heights Neighborhood Survey, PRATT INSTITUTE CENTER FOR COMMUNITY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT, Oct. 2004, at 1, http://www.prattcenter.net/
pubs/prospectsurveyreport.pdf (“Prospect Heights, a neighborhood of 20,000 people
near downtown Brooklyn, has been the focus of significant media attention after the
unveiling of the proposed redevelopment of the Brooklyn Atlantic Yards Project by
Forest City Ratner Companies in the spring of 2004.  The multi-billion dollar plan
includes a 19,000-seat Arena and basketball sports complex, commercial space for
office and retail, and market-rate housing.”).
126 Id. at 2 (“According to the 2000 U.S. census, 14% of Prospect Heights residents
are Latino, while 86% are non-Latino.  Of the non-Latino population, 28% are white,
51% are black, 4% are Asian and 3% are of two or more races.”).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 5.
129 Id. at 3.
130 Aron Kahn, Quality-of-Life Issue Debated, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 28, 2004, at
5B.
131 Id.
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proceedings for future sports complexes, they have become more
vocal in determining what will and will not benefit the public,
thereby creating their own definition of “public use.”
V. PROTECTING THE PUBLIC FROM PUBLIC TAKINGS
Over time, eminent domain has become a tool misused by city
officials.  As former Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer so eloquently put
it, “[w]ith the new powers we have with eminent domain, we can
now go to the three cement companies along the river and relocate
them to another area.”132  These “new powers” must not be miscon-
strued by government officials and agencies.  There is no public
benefit in forcing a family to leave its home, or a business to
change locations to make room for the construction and private
benefit of a sports stadium.  If privately owned sports stadiums are
believed to be a public benefit, shopping centers, movie theaters,
corporate office centers, and even restaurants can be considered a
benefit to the public as well.  The motivation behind all of the
above is profit133—not profit that will be invested in the public
community, but rather private profit that will end up in the bank
accounts of a few individuals.134
The powers of eminent domain must be regulated so that if a
public taking does occur, it will be the public who truly benefits.
The Framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated such
exploitation of the “public purpose” exception to the Fifth Amend-
ment.  Therefore, it is up to current legislators to regulate the un-
tamed power of eminent domain.  The following are suggested
remedies and precautions to protect the public and curtail the mis-
use of eminent domain.
A. Determination of Actual Economic Benefit to the Public
When developers and team owners introduce the idea of relo-
cating a sports team to a specific city, they claim the benefits to the
132 R.J. King, Riverfront Rebirth to Cost $5 Billion, DETROIT NEWS, June 11, 1999, at 4B
(mentioning the city’s acquisition of land for two new stadiums for the Detroit Tigers
and Detroit Lions).
133 See generally CAGAN & DEMAUSE, supra note 112; KEVIN DELANEY & RICK ECKSTEIN,
PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE STADIUMS: THE BATTLE OVER BUILDING SPORTS STADIUMS
(2003).
134 DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 133, at 40 (stating that publicly financed stadi-
ums are likened “to other pieces of the city’s publicly financed infrastructure, such as
libraries, parks, and museums . . . [b]ut among all these entities, only the stadium is a
privately owned, for-profit business that can be sold for a huge private windfall after it
is built.”).
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public through economic development will outweigh the costs and
inconvenience that the public might experience.135  Many city offi-
cials support the theory that the construction of a state-of-the-art
stadium will not only appease the team, but will also provide
thousands of temporary and permanent jobs to local residents who
will ultimately have the privilege of attending the games and root-
ing for their home team.136
As previously mentioned, the Brookings Institution conducted
a survey examining “the local economic development argument
from all angles: case studies of the effect of specific facilities, as well
as comparisons among cities and even neighborhoods that have
and have not sunk hundreds of millions of dollars into sports devel-
opment.”137  Their findings are surprising in that, contrary to pop-
ular belief, the public does not benefit from the acquisition of
private property for use as a sports stadium.138  The study found
that sports teams and facilities are not a source of local economic
growth and employment.139  Sports facilities do not attract tourists
or new industry.140
The Brookings study also concluded that the magnitude of
public investment exceeds the financial benefit of a new stadium to
a team.141  Host cities generally pay more than $10,000,000 per
year for the privilege of having a stadium in their community.142
Even the most successful new stadiums end up costing residents
money.  For example, Oriole Park costs Maryland residents
$14,000,000 per year.143  This leads to the conclusion that stadiums
135 Id.  Advocates of stadiums have argued that a “city’s professional sports are capa-
ble of doing what religion cannot: bringing disparate people together around a
shared urban identity.” Id.
136 See, e.g., Press Release, George E. Pataki, Governor, Governor Pataki, Mayor
Bloomberg and New York Yankees Announce Plans for Area Revitalization and New
Stadium (June 15, 2005), http://www.nylovesbiz.com/press/press_display.asp?
id=620.
137 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 107, at 36.  For more information see Sports, Jobs,
and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums (Roger G. Noll &
Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997).
138 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 107, at 36-37.
139 Id. at 36.
140 Id.  Oriole Park at Camden Yards might be considered an exception to this rule,
since about a third of attendees at Orioles games reside outside the Baltimore area.
In addition, Baltimore is just forty miles from Washington, D.C. which, until recently,
had no major league baseball team. Id.  Despite Oriole Park’s advantages, “the net
gain to Baltimore’s economy in terms of new jobs and incremental tax revenues is
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are more an economic drain than a benefit to the public.  An addi-
tional study by the Heartland Institute supports this conclusion.  In
that study, twenty-seven out of thirty cities with sports stadiums con-
structed within the past ten years showed no compelling relation-
ship between the presence of the new stadium and actual per-
capita personal income growth.144  In the remaining three cities,
the existence of a sports stadium had a negative impact.145
Therefore, before condemning private land to be used for a
future stadium, state legislators need to thoroughly research the
advantages and disadvantages to the affected public.  Using case
studies of comparable cities before and after stadium construction,
officials can determine if the public really will benefit from this
expensive and extensive transformation.  Stadiums that would have
a negative financial impact on the local residents are not an advan-
tage to the public.
B. Strict Interpretation of “Public Use”
While considering whether or not to deprive persons of their
private property, the judiciary should apply a strict interpretation
of “public use,”146 only considering a taking to be for the public if
the land will provide guaranteed direct benefits to society.147  One
approach is to apply a balancing test.  Using this approach, a court
would review the factors considered by the state or local officials.
Such factors include the cost and effect of relocating existing busi-
nesses and residences to make way for the stadium complex, the
disruption of local neighborhoods, the projected cost and benefit
to the community, and the practicability of the public use of the
stadium.  The realistic projected public benefit would have to out-
weigh the private gain in order for a taking to be constitutional.
Some courts have taken similar approaches in observing a
strict interpretation of “public use.”  The Superior Court of Massa-
chusetts “excoriated Springfield Mayor Michael J. Albano for im-
properly using the city’s eminent domain powers to take privately
owned land to build a minor league ballpark.”148  Specifically, the
court ruled that the city acted in bad faith in exercising the power
144 Baade, supra note 114, at 15.
145 Id.
146 See City of Springfield v. Dreison Investments, Inc., No. 19991318, 991230,
000014, 2000 WL 782971, at *50  (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000) (holding that if the
dominant reason for the taking was to benefit private interests, it would be invalid).
147 Scott, supra note 33, at 475.
148 Vaillancourt, supra note 9, at C20.
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of eminent domain to acquire title.149
The state of Massachusetts has avoided these specious con-
demnations, opting to use eminent domain for actual public pur-
poses like roads, schools, police stations, utilities, parks, and
conservation of open spaces.150  A Massachusetts Superior Court
ruling against public land-taking for a ballpark in Springfield has
quieted recent proposals for a $660,000,000 plan to build a new
Fenway Park on a fifteen-acre parcel of privately owned land next
to the old stadium.151  Stadium opponents will surely use this deci-
sion to challenge any Boston eminent domain proceedings.
Though Red Sox proponents may argue that the taking of land for
a sports stadium is a valid public purpose, in Massachusetts “the
extension of public privileges, powers, and exemptions and the
use, rental and operation of the projects must be adequately gov-
erned by appropriate standards and principals set out in legisla-
tion.”152 Since the legislation has no clause allowing a taking of
private property to benefit private interests, Massachusetts courts
will not extend the application of eminent domain to seize land for
privately owned sports teams.
Another significant judicial stride in the strict interpretation
of “public use” is the 2004 Michigan Supreme Court opinion in
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, which overruled the Poletown deci-
sion.153  The justices in Wayne agreed that Poletown was “a radical
departure from fundamental constitutional principles,” and they
“must overrule Poletown in order to vindicate our Constitution, pro-
tect the people’s property rights, and preserve the legitimacy of the
judicial branch as the expositor—not creator—of fundamental
law.”154  This was a groundbreaking step towards the narrow appli-
cation of the “public use” doctrine.  The court stated, “Our deci-
sion today does not announce a new rule of law, but rather returns
our law to that which existed before Poletown and which has been
149 Dreison Investments Inc., 2000 WL 782971, at *45 (Springfield had attempted to
take a shopping mall and manufacturing plant by eminent domain to build a minor
league ballpark.).
150 Dana Berliner, Eminent Domain for Sox Is Off-Base, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 15, 2001,
at 23.
151 DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE RE-
PORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 99 (2003), available at http://www.
castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED_report.pdf.
152 Joan Vennochi, Judge’s Decision Is Bad News for Red Sox, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18,
2000, at A11.
153 Wayne, 684 N.W.2d at 787.
154 Id.
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mandated by our constitution . . . .”155  It cited the dissent by Jus-
tice Ryan in Poletown, which put forth three principles to determine
“public use.”156  The first principle discussed by Justice Ryan is that
a private land transfer to a private entity must involve “‘public ne-
cessity of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable.’”157  The sec-
ond principle concerns a situation in which a transfer of private
land “to a private entity is consistent with the constitution’s ‘public
use’ requirement when the private entity remains accountable to
the public in its use of that property.”158  Finally, “condemned land
may be transferred to a private entity when the selection of the
land to be condemned is itself based on public concern.”159  This
analysis to determine “public use” has overruled the historically
overbroad application and will hopefully set precedent for future
cases.
As some state courts are progressively narrowing the definition
of “public use” in takings cases, their strict interpretation must be
applied to takings for sports stadiums, where developers and sports
franchises have avoided the open real estate market and maxi-
mized their own profits at the public’s expense.  Courts should
therefore contemplate such factors considered in Massachusetts
and Michigan and apply the narrowest interpretation of “public
use.”
C. Concise Legislative Definition of “Public Use”
If the judicial branch fails to narrowly interpret “public use,”
consistent legislation should be passed to regulate the powers of
eminent domain.  City officials and authorities are largely un-
checked in their power to control “redevelopment” and therefore
have acquired an influential role in the real estate market.160  As a
result, municipal agencies become dominated by large private cor-
porations, enabling such corporations to gain ownership of prime
locations that they would not otherwise be able to obtain.161
Legislation should mandate that any land to be condemned
155 Id.
156 Id. at 781.
157 Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting)). “[T]he exercise
of eminent domain for private corporations has been limited to those enterprises
generating public benefits whose very existence depends on the use of land that can
be assembled only by the coordination central government alone is capable of achiev-
ing.” Id.
158 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782.
159 Id. at 782-83.
160 Scott, supra note 33, at 470.
161 Id.
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via eminent domain should be in the amount that is justifiably
needed.  In order to propose an eminent domain proceeding, city
officials should be required to specify the amount of land needed
for their redevelopment project, the amount of private land that
will be taken, and the reason for it.  After the preliminary require-
ment of land use specification, city officials should then apply the
balancing test.  If the public benefit received from the taking out-
weighs all private benefit, the eminent domain proceedings can be
justified.  This type of legislation could be applied on the federal or
state level.
At a state level, federal subsidies given to states for funding
stadiums and other sports complexes should be conditioned on
the results of a two-prong test.  First, state officials must prove that
the land being taken is the justifiable amount needed for redevel-
opment.  Second, they must meet the requirements of the balanc-
ing test by proving that the public benefit will outweigh the private
gain.  If both prongs are met, then the federal government should
reward state and local governments with subsidies and tax incen-
tives to construct the stadium.  The application of the two-prong
test would avoid unfair competition among states in their attempts
to attract sports franchises because all states would have to guaran-
tee public benefit in order to be financially subsidized.  If a state
fails the two-prong test and cannot prove that the public will bene-
fit from the takings, funding will not be available.  This could also
quash potential rivalry among cities and states for sports teams be-
cause they will not have substantial financial backing to support the
construction of a new stadium.  Finally, it would leave the funding
of new stadiums to private corporations and investors, who are the
ultimate beneficiaries.
In light of the Kelo decision, some state and federal legislators
have proposed and enacted legislation that would protect the pri-
vate property of U.S. citizens.162  There are several bills pending in
Congress specifically limiting both federal and state use of eminent
domain.163  Stating that “the protection of private property is one
162 Donald Lambro, Alabama Limits Eminent Domain, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at
A1. After the Kelo decision, legislation to end or limit the use of eminent domain was
introduced in seventeen states: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas. Id.
163 See Eminent Domain Limitation Act of 2005, H.R. 3631, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(1)
(2005) (prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic development); see also
Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3135, 109th Cong. (2005)
(preventing states from using “economic development as a reason for exercising
[their] power of eminent domain if [f]ederal funds would contribute in any way” to
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of the three basic tenets of American government” and that it is the
“constitutional duty of the Federal Government to defend the Con-
stitution,” Congress has declared that “economic development is
not a public use, for the purposes of eminent domain.”164  The Em-
inent Domain Limitation Act of 2005 even cites the Kelo opinion
and states that this expansion of the definition of public use “signif-
icantly threatens[s] private property rights.”165
In Alabama, legislation was recently passed166 prohibiting
“governments from using their eminent-domain authority to take
privately owned properties for the purpose of turning them over to
retail, industrial, office or residential developers.”167  It was signed
by Republican Governor Bob Riley, who opposed the Supreme
Court’s Kelo ruling, calling it “misguided” and a “threat to all prop-
erty owners.”168 Governor Riley added that a “property rights re-
volt is sweeping the nation, and Alabama is leading it.”169  It is
obvious that the state was reacting to the very facts which gave rise
to Kelo—and making a good-faith attempt to prevent a recurrence
of those facts.
New York also responded to the Kelo decision with proposed
legislation to amend its eminent domain procedure law.170  Al-
though it recognized the Supreme Court’s decision to expand the
eminent domain power, New York legislators acknowledged that
“since the taking of a person’s home or dwelling is oftentimes a
traumatic process, procedural safeguards and transparency are
necessary to protect the citizens of this state.”171  Such proposed
bills include a mandatory vote of local government for instances
where eminent domain is proposed for the condemnation and
transfer of land to a private developer,172 municipal approval of the
exercise of eminent domain when the primary purpose is eco-
nomic development, and the creation of a temporary state commis-
sion to consider further eminent domain reforms.173
the exercise of eminent domain, and also prohibiting the federal government from
using “economic development as a reason for exercising its power of eminent
domain”).
164 H.R. 3631, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
165 Id.
166 ALA. CODE § 11-1B-2 (2005).
167 Lambro, supra note 162, at A1.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See A9050, Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); A8865, Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005);
A9043, Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
171 A9050, Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
172 A8865, Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
173 See A9043, Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
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The fact that over a quarter of states have rapidly moved to
amend their eminent domain law in favor of a more narrow inter-
pretation of public use exemplifies that the majority of the Su-
preme Court Justices do not share a similar interpretation of the
public use exception to the Fifth Amendment as do the citizens of
this country.
VI. CONCLUSION
The exploitation of eminent domain to take private land for
sports arenas is a public issue that must be addressed.  The list of
sports teams wishing to relocate to newer, larger stadiums is exten-
sive, with a new team added regularly.  It is crucial that the public
be aware of this practice so that it can react before a developer sets
his sights on a community for a future stadium.  Studies have
shown that new stadiums do not bring economic benefit to com-
munities subjected to such transformation.  While authorities are
seizing property of residents and businesses through eminent do-
main under the guise of “public use,” in reality, the actual benefi-
ciaries of such takings are private developers and team owners.
Although some state courts and legislators have made advances in
addressing the interpretation of “public use,” a strict definition
must be consistently applied throughout the nation.  If the Su-
preme Court will not take the appropriate steps, then lawmakers
must continue to respond to the concerns of the public by creating
protective legislation to narrowly define “public use” and safeguard
the individual’s constitutional right to own property.  Finally, the
public, as a whole, must continue to express its shock and discon-
tent over what officials and legislators believe to be in the public’s
best interest.

